This page is dedicated to the monthly publication of short texts, in Italian and English, which summarize the content of articles published by SIEP members in Italian and international scientific journals. The aim is to disseminate public economics issues that are considered relevant for the Italian policy maker. The page is edited by an Editorial Board appointed within the Board of Management with the scientific collaboration of Dr. Monica Bozzano.

Edtorial board 2024-27: Nadia Fiorino, Massimiliano Piacenza, Antonio Scialà

Past editorial boards:
2020-21: Paola Profeta, Leonzio Rizzo, Gilberto Turati.
2021-24: Massimiliano Piacenza, Gilberto Turati, Annalisa Vinella.

The impact of a public voucher for the arts

Baldin A., Marenzi A., Zantomio F., 2025 – Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Public support for cultural consumption raises a familiar question in public economics. Participation in cultural activities varies markedly with income and family background, yet the benefits of cultural consumption may extend beyond the individual consumer. If exposure to books, cinema, live performances, and museums contributes to the accumulation of cultural capital, broadens opportunities for participation, and fosters persistent consumption habits, reducing barriers to access can provide a rationale for public intervention. Whether vouchers achieve this objective, however, is ultimately an empirical question. For individuals who would have purchased the same goods anyway, public spending may simply crowd out private expenditure. The relevant policy question is therefore not only whether cultural demand should be subsidized, but also whether, for whom, and to what extent such subsidies generate additional cultural consumption.

The Italian 18app programme provides a particularly informative setting in which to address these questions. In The impact of a public voucher for the arts, published in the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Andrea Baldin, Anna Marenzi, and Francesca Zantomio provide the first causal evaluation of the effects of a cultural voucher on young people’s consumption. The contribution extends beyond the Italian case: 18app inspired similar initiatives in France, Spain, and Germany, while the design of cultural voucher schemes continues to evolve.

The analysis draws on the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat) survey Aspects of Daily Life for 2013–2019 and exploits age-based variation in eligibility before and after the introduction of the voucher. Eligible individuals aged 18–20 are compared with 21–23-year-olds, who were never eligible. Nineteen- and twenty-year-olds are included because the benefit, awarded at age eighteen, could be used for more than one year, whereas the survey records age at the time of interview and cultural consumption over the previous twelve months.

The identification strategy combines a difference-in-differences design with entropy-balancing reweighting. Before estimation, the treatment and comparison groups are made comparable along a set of observable characteristics, including education and employment status, co-residence with parents, parental education and household economic conditions, and municipality size. Because the survey does not record actual voucher use, the estimates should be interpreted as intention-to-treat effects.

The results point to a clear increase in cultural participation along the extensive margin. Eligibility raises the probability of going to the cinema at least once a year by 5.6%, attending a non-classical music concert by 4.1%, reading at least one book by 4.2%, and purchasing books or e-books online by 7.1%. Along the intensive margin, the average effect is statistically significant only for cinema attendance, with an increase of 0.56 visits per year.

The most pronounced heterogeneity emerges by family background. Socio-economic status is proxied by the highest level of education attained within the household, an indicator that the literature identifies as a strong predictor of cultural participation. The effects are concentrated among young people living in households with no university graduate. For this group, the voucher increases both entry into the consumption of cinema, non-classical concerts, and books, and the frequency of participation: cinema attendance rises by 20%, non-classical concert attendance by 23%, classical concert attendance by 45%, and museum visits by 16%. By contrast, effects are close to zero for children of university graduates. This pattern is consistent with economic and access constraints playing a larger role among young people with lower levels of family cultural capital.

The paper also quantifies the extent to which voucher-funded spending is genuinely additional rather than replacing purchases that would have occurred in any case. Combining administrative data on voucher use with average prices and the estimated treatment effects, the authors find that each euro spent through the voucher generates €0.13 of additional cinema expenditure and €0.19 of additional spending on non-classical concerts. Among young people from households with no university graduate, additional expenditure reaches €0.28 per euro for classical concerts. Crowding out of private spending is therefore substantial, but incomplete, and is less pronounced where baseline cultural consumption is lower.

Two additional findings suggest that the effects of the programme extend beyond the recipient’s immediate purchase. Among parents of eligible eighteen-year-olds, online purchases of books and e-books increase by 21%, consistent with within-household spillovers. Moreover, young people who have exhausted the voucher continue to attend the cinema more frequently than never-eligible peers, with a 28% differential. This persistence is consistent with habit formation and the development of cultural tastes.

These findings are particularly relevant in light of subsequent reforms to the programme. Introduced in 2016, 18app granted €500 to all residents turning eighteen and was therefore universal with respect to income and educational performance. The 2023 Budget Law replaced it with two selective €500 cards that can be combined. The Youth Culture Card is available to young people in households with an ISEE indicator not exceeding €35,000, while the Merit Card is awarded to students who obtain an upper-secondary-school diploma with the maximum grade of 100 by the year in which they turn nineteen. This reform marked a clear shift from age-based universalism to eligibility criteria based on household economic conditions and educational performance. From 2027, both cards will be replaced by the Carta Valore, available to those who obtain their diploma by the year in which they turn nineteen. The new scheme removes both the ISEE threshold and the grade requirement, but it does not restore the universalism of 18app, since eligibility remains conditional on timely completion of upper-secondary education.

These results have direct implications for the design of future cultural vouchers. A universal voucher generated the largest responses among young people furthest from cultural consumption. Eligibility rules based on merit or regular educational progression may therefore exclude precisely those groups, since lower grades and less linear educational trajectories are more common in less educated families. An ISEE threshold can reduce transfers to individuals who would have consumed cultural goods anyway, but it may also generate non-take-up and exclude lower-middle-income households just above the cutoff. Finally, cultural consumption among young people is often shared: narrowing eligibility may weaken peer and family spillovers that, as the evidence suggests, contribute to the effectiveness of the policy.



Global public good provision in emergency states: A model of (asymmetric) yardstick competition between rent-seeking governments

Di Liddo G., Vinella A. (2024) – Socio-Economic Planning Sciences

Global crises confront governments with a policy dilemma. When an effective response requires an innovative good, each country may contribute from the outset to its development, bearing the associated costs and risks, or wait and purchase the solution developed elsewhere. The Covid-19 pandemic made this choice visible: some governments financed research, technological adaptation and manufacturing capacity, while others relied more heavily on vaccines produced abroad.

In the article, “Global public good provision in emergency states: A model of (asymmetric) yardstick competition between rent-seeking governments”, recently published in Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Giuseppe Di Liddo and Annalisa Vinella examine this dilemma from a political economy perspective. They consider two otherwise identical countries governed by politicians concerned exclusively with rent extraction. Incumbents choose public expenditure to increase their re-election prospects and maximise rents over two periods. Each government may finance the adaptation of an existing technology and production capacity or refrain from investing and procure the good internationally. Investment entails an immediate sacrifice of rent and may fail. If it succeeds, the government can purchase the good at a lower cost and, when the other country has not invested, appropriate a share of export revenues through its power to authorise or restrict foreign sales.

Political competition takes the form of yardstick competition, a mechanism studied mainly in the context of comparable local governments and less established at the national level. In the proposed framework, it becomes plausible during an international emergency, when global media attention makes cross-country differences salient. Voters do not observe crisis costs, strategic risks or extracted rents, but compare public services before the election. Current expenditure is therefore a political investment: it reduces present rent but raises the chance of a second term.

When both governments adopt the same strategy, they face the same costs, risks and revenues. The equilibrium is symmetric: service provision, re-election probabilities and rents coincide, so yardstick competition operates without bias. When strategies differ, the investor bears the initial cost and technological risk but may obtain procurement savings and export rents; the other government preserves current rent and may later purchase the foreign solution. Voters still compare only visible services. Re-election probabilities no longer track expected rents: yardstick competition becomes biased, creating an endogenous disparity.

The authors find that, when the investment cost is low, both governments invest; when it is very high, neither does. For intermediate costs, an asymmetric equilibrium may emerge if the probability of success and/or the benefits of innovation are sufficiently large. One government gives up rent today to obtain lower procurement costs and a share of export revenues tomorrow. The other avoids the initial outlay, maximises the rent it can appropriate before the election, and relies on the good developed through the other country’s investment eventually becoming available.

Counterintuitively, better technological prospects do not necessarily induce both governments to invest. If the other country is highly likely to develop the good, non-contribution may become more attractive: an opportunistic government avoids the upfront cost and later benefits from imports. Diversification is more likely when incumbents place greater weight on the future. This is not because the non-investor is less patient – both have the same discount factor – but because duplicating the other’s investment yields few additional gains and makes current rent extraction more attractive. The two strategies thus represent complementary forms of rent extraction.

The framework, developed during the pandemic, is not limited to health crises. Cyber resilience illustrates its broader reach. Estonia’s 2024-2030 strategy strengthens digital resilience, incident monitoring and national expertise ex ante. After the 2022 cyberattacks, Albania hosted a US Hunt Forward team for three months to identify hostile activity and vulnerabilities. This does not establish deliberate underinvestment, but it shows that a government under attack may draw on capabilities developed elsewhere. Since 2025, the EU Cybersecurity Reserve has institutionalised this possibility by making qualified response and recovery services available on request.

Antimicrobial resistance shows why the problem remains relevant to health policy even after Covid-19. Developing antibiotics is costly and uncertain, while prudent use limits sales and weakens market incentives. In 2022, NICE and NHS England introduced annual payments for two drugs based on clinical value rather than sales volumes; in 2024, the model was extended to all four UK nations. A 2025 study compares the support provided by G7 and EU countries for antibacterial innovation with the contribution each country would be expected to make in proportion to its economic capacity. The United Kingdom and Italy are close to their estimated shares, whereas most other countries contribute less. This does not demonstrate opportunistic waiting, but it highlights the possibility that some health systems may later obtain antibiotics whose availability was supported largely by incentives financed by other countries.

These two cases reinforce three implications of the model. Countries facing the same threat may adopt different strategies despite similar initial capacities; external assistance or foreign-financed innovation may weaken incentives to invest; and public comparisons may overlook ex ante costs, risks and benefits generated for other countries. These cases are not empirical tests of opportunistic behaviour; they show that relying on investments made elsewhere is a real option. The paper does not identify the socially optimal response. It explains, however, why global public-good provision may require supranational institutions that share preparedness costs, make national contributions visible, and reduce the attraction of waiting for others to invest.

Access to Healthcare and Its Inequality: Analytical and Spatial Perspectives

Measuring health care access and its inequality: A decomposition approach – Abatemarco A., Aria M., Beraldo S., Collaro M., 2024 – Economic Modelling

Immigrants’ clusters and unequal access to healthcare treatments – Di Giacomo M., Perucca G., Piacenza M., Turati G. 2024 – Regional Science and Urban Economics

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