SHOULD TAX BASES OVERLAP IN A FEDERATION WITH LOBBYING?

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Abstract

We examine the tax assignment problem in a federation with two layers of government sharing an elastic tax base, in which Leviathan policy makers levy an excise tax in an imperfectly competitive market and producers lobby for tax rate cuts. If the lobby of producers is very influential on policy makers, we find that taxation by both layers of government might be optimal, provided that the market of the taxed good is highly concentrated; otherwise, it is optimal to assign the power to tax only to one level of government. Taxation by both layers of government is not optimal either when the influence of the lobby is weak, whatever the degree of market power. We also examine a richer set of tax setting outcomes, by considering the possibility that state policy makers have heterogeneous tax policy objectives.

Keywords: Vertical Tax Externalities, Tax Assignment, Lobbying, Specific Taxation.

JEL Codes: H71, H77, D70.
1 Introduction

According to the traditional fiscal federalism literature (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972), decentralizing taxing powers is much more problematic than decentralizing expenditure functions, because of the tax-base mobility threat and also because of the likely violations of the principle of horizontal equity among identical individuals living in different jurisdictions of the federation. Despite these normative prescriptions, in the real world we observe important federal countries, like Canada and the United States, in which some of the main tax bases (e.g., corporate income, personal income, turnover, value-added) are shared between the upper and the lower levels of government. Hence in these countries there is not a rigorous distinction between local and federal tax bases, as the traditional fiscal federalism theory prescribes. However, whenever this distinction does not occur, the tax bases of different layers of government overlap, giving rise to a common pool problem—the so-called vertical tax externality—with the tax decision of each level of government affecting the shared tax base, a fact generally leading to excessive taxation (Keen, 1998).

The literature analysing this issue (e.g., Boadway et al., 1998; Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2002; Dahlby and Wilson, 2003) assumes welfare maximizing governments and therefore it takes a normative approach to the tax assignment problem. However, it is widely recognized that also political institutions play a crucial role in shaping fiscal policies, in addition to normative criteria. Indeed, the introduction of political factors into the traditional fiscal federalism models is the distinctive feature of the so-called ‘second generation’ theory of fiscal federalism (Oates, 2005). In this paper, our goal is to add a contribution to this field, by analyzing how the tax assignment problem in a federation is affected by the activity of a special interest group that lobbies the policy makers for moderate taxation when tax bases overlap.

In particular, we consider a federation composed of an upper level (federal) and a lower level (state) of government. Policy makers are assumed to be revenue maximizers and can levy an excise tax on a consumers’ good that is produced in an imperfectly competitive market. There are no direct interactions between the state policy makers, since consumers are assumed to be immobile. If only one layer of government is allowed to tax, total taxation falls short of the social optimum, provided that firms successfully lobby for tax rates reductions. When both layers of government are entitled to tax, total taxation may be either higher or lower than the social optimum, since the distortion
due to the vertical tax externality and the distortion due to lobbying work in opposite directions.

Our main finding concerns the link between market structure, influence of the lobby, and the optimal tax assignment. If the market is highly concentrated, and if lobbying is highly effective, then aggregate tax revenue is maximized by entitling both layers of government with the power to tax. A highly effective lobbying can therefore justify tax base sharing among government layers of a federal nation. In this case, lobbying by firms works as a ‘private’ solution to the vertical tax externality problem, that could make redundant the adoption of a ‘public’ solution in the form of a compensation transfer mechanism (Boadway and Keen, 1996; Kotsogiannis, forthcoming). On the other hand, if lobbying is not very effective in influencing policy makers, whatever the degree of market power, or if lobbying is highly effective but firms have low market power, it is then optimal to assign taxation only to one layer of government.

We also consider a special case in which the policy maker of the state in which production is located refrains from full tax revenue maximization, due to her concern about occupational levels in the taxed industry. The introduction of this kind of preference heterogeneity allows us to derive some interesting asymmetric equilibria that closely match observed tax policy in the real world.

Lobbying by special interest groups has been recently introduced in the fiscal federalism literature by Bordignon et al. (2008). They focus on the role of lobbying on the choice between centralization and decentralization of public policies, finding that centralization is better for social welfare when the lobbying groups have conflicting interests, whereas decentralization might be better when the lobbies interests are aligned. This paper introduces lobbying in a more specific context than the one examined by Bordignon et al. (2008). Moreover, while they appeal, to model lobbying behavior, to the many-principals, one-agent (Dixit et al., 1997) and to the many-principals, many-agents (Prat and Rustichini, 2003) literature, we appeal in this paper to the one-principal, many-agents literature (Segal, 1999).

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model and characterizes the equilibrium in the oligopoly markets, for given tax rates. It also derives the social optimum, that is the tax rates that maximize the policy makers’ objective functions in the benchmark case of no vertical tax externalities and no lobbying. Section 3 considers tax setting in the federation in the presence of vertical tax externalities between higher and lower levels of government, assuming that all policy
makers play Nash. Section 4 introduces lobbying by producers and examines its impact on tax policy. Section 5 addresses the tax assignment problem, i.e. whether it is better to give the power to tax only to one level of government or to both levels. Section 6 replicates the analysis assuming that the federal policy maker is a Stackelberg leader in tax setting; the outcomes under simultaneous and sequential tax setting are then compared. Section 7 discusses and justifies a key assumption of our analysis concerning the objective functions of policy makers. Section 8 provides conclusions and lines for future research.

2 The framework

Consider a federation composed of the central (or federal) government and two regional (or state) governments. Both layers of government might be entitled to levy an excise tax on a commodity that is consumed in both regions but that is produced only in one region.\footnote{This is just a stylized way for capturing the fact that production of some commodities is usually concentrated in some regions, whereas its consumption is uniformly distributed across regions.} We rule out the possibility of cross border shopping by assuming that consumers make purchases of the good only in their own region of residence. The number of producers is given and we assume that they compete à la Cournot in each regional market.\footnote{We consider consumption-based commodity-taxation only in a specific (or excise) form, although it is well known that specific and ad valorem taxes are not equivalent in terms of tax incidence if the taxed goods are exchanged in non-competitive markets (see, e.g. Myles, 1995, chapter 11, for a throughout survey). One reason for this choice is that we have in mind goods like cigarettes, gasoline or alcoholic drinks, that are generally taxed in a specific form, although in some countries a mix of both types of tax instruments is applied (Cnossen, 2009). Another reason is that our analysis focuses on the interplay between vertical tax externalities and lobbying and not, like most of the literature dealing with the comparison of the two types of tax instruments, on efficient tax structures.} Policy makers at all levels are assumed to care for tax revenue collected. However, tax policy may not be exclusively determined by Leviathan behavior. Policy makers may also be interested in cashing campaign contributions offered by firms in exchange for tax rates cuts. Moreover, we consider the possibility that the policy maker in charge in the jurisdiction in which production takes place may refrain from setting a high tax burden, in order to limit the negative impact on production, and thus on occupational levels, in the taxed industry. Consumers’ surplus, instead, is assumed to bear no weight whatsoever in tax policy setting.\footnote{This is an extreme but simple way for capturing the idea that it is desirable to limit the consumption of the taxed good, either for paternalistic reasons (like in the case of unhealthy cigarettes smoking) or...
Tax setting is modelled as a two-stage process. In the first stage, the producers’ association lobbies the policy makers in order to win tax rates cuts that increase firms’ profits. In the second stage, the central and the local policy makers simultaneously and independently set their own tax rate. There is then a third and final stage in which local markets equilibrium is determined, given the tax rates set at the previous stages. The model is solved backward. We thus start from the final stage and solve for the equilibrium in the regional markets.

2.1 Regional oligopoly markets

We model an oligopoly market in each region \( i, i = 1, 2 \), in a partial equilibrium framework. All firms are located in region 2 and their number, \( m \geq 1 \), is fixed (the model encompasses a monopoly market as a limit case for \( m = 1 \)). We also assume that all firms are identical, selling an homogenous good in both regions and producing at constant marginal (and average) costs \( c > 0 \) (there are no fixed costs).

Consumers are immobile and purchase the consumption good at the prevailing market price only in their own region of residence. They are also assumed to be identical both within and across regions, with an individual demand function that takes a linear form:

\[
q = b(a - p),
\]

where \( p \) is the consumer’s price, \( q \) is quantity consumed, \( a > 0 \) and \( b > 0 \) are the demand parameters. Let \( Q_i \) be aggregate consumption and let \( n_i > 0, i = 1, 2, \) be the mass of consumers that are resident in region \( i \); we also normalize the mass of consumers resident in the federation to unity, i.e. \( n_1 + n_2 = 1 \). By aggregating the individual demand (1) we then get the inverse market demand in region \( i \) as:

\[
p_i = a - \frac{Q_i}{bn_i}, \quad i = 1, 2.
\]

Let \( T \) and \( t_i \) be the specific tax rates levied, on a destination basis, respectively by the federal and the state \( i \) governments, on firms’ sales. Let \( q_{ji} \) be the quantity sold for correcting market failures (like in the case of pollution generating gasoline consumption).

\(^4\)In Section 6 we consider a Stackelberg tax setting game, with the federal policy maker choosing first and the regional policy makers choosing second.

\(^5\)We are assuming that producers make direct sales to consumers. Introducing a retail sector would not affect the analysis, provided that retailers operate at constant marginal costs, equal to average
by firm $j$ in region $i$, so that
\[ \sum_{j=1}^{m} q_{ji} = Q_i. \]  

Firm $j$’s profits are then defined as:
\[ \Pi_j = \sum_{i=1}^{2} (p_i - c - T - t_i)q_{ji}. \]

In each market $i$, firms compete à la Cournot by setting simultaneously and independently their own quantity sold. By differentiating (4) with respect to $q_{ji}, i = 1, 2$, subject to (2) and (3), the necessary first order conditions for profit maximization by firm $j$ can be written as:
\[ \alpha - T - t_i - \frac{\sum_{k \neq j} q_{ki}}{bn_i} - \frac{2q_{ji}}{bn_i} = 0, \quad i = 1, 2, \]
where we define $\alpha = a - c$ to simplify the notation. By summing equations (5) over $j = 1, \ldots, m$, one gets:
\[ m(\alpha - T - t_i) - \frac{(m-1)Q_i}{bn_i} - \frac{2Q_i}{bn_i} = 0, \quad i = 1, 2. \]

From the latter equation we then obtain the equilibrium aggregate quantity as a function of the relevant tax rates:
\[ Q_i(T, t_i) = \frac{m}{1 + m} b(\alpha - T - t_i)n_i, \quad i = 1, 2. \]

Notice that, since we are assuming identical firms, the equilibrium is symmetric, with $q_{ji}(T, t_i) = m^{-1}Q_i(T, t_i), j = 1, \ldots, m$. In what follows we restrict the analysis to market equilibria such that $\alpha > T + t_i$, in order to ensure that $Q_i(T, t_i) > 0$.

By substituting $Q_i(T, t_i)$ into (2) and then solving for $p_i$ we get the equilibrium consumers’ price:
\[ p_i(T, t_i) = c + T + t_i + \frac{\alpha - (T + t_i)}{1 + m}, \quad i = 1, 2. \]

For given tax rates, the consumers’ price is decreasing in the number of firms, ranging from its highest level when the market is monopolized ($m = 1$) to its asymptotically costs, in perfectly competitive markets. Under these hypotheses, it is equivalent to levy the tax on producers or to retailers. Moreover, only producers make positive profits and have an incentive to lobby for tax rates reductions.

Under the given hypotheses (linear demand and linear production costs) the necessary first order conditions for profit maximization are also sufficient.
lowest level (marginal cost pricing) when the market approaches perfect competition ($m \to \infty$).

Finally, by aggregating $\Pi_j$ in (4) over $j = 1, \ldots, m$, and then substituting for $p_i(T, t_i)$ and $Q_i(T, t_i)$, we compute aggregate firms’ profits (net of excise taxes, but gross of contributions spent on lobbying activity, see Section 4):

$$
\Pi(T, t_1, t_2) = \sum_{i=1}^{2} \frac{m}{(1 + m)^2} b(\alpha - T - t_i)^2 n_i.
$$

Notice that, as expected, profits are decreasing in $m$ and tend to zero for $m \to \infty$. Moreover, taxation reduces profits, giving an incentive to firms to lobby the policy makers for tax rates reductions.\footnote{\textsuperscript{7} Taxation has always a negative impact on profits when the market is monopolized ($m = 1$). In oligopoly ($m \geq 2$), taxation may cause price overshifting, and therefore it may increase profits, provided that the slope of the demand curve is of a particular type (Seade, 1985). With a linear demand, however, taxation always reduces profits also in oligopoly.}

\section*{2.2 Social optimum}

We define the social optimum as the tax policy that maximizes the unweighted sum of the policy makers’ objective functions. In this case, neither vertical tax externalities nor lobbying by firms distorts tax policy. The federal policy maker, as well as state 1 policy maker, are assumed to be pure Leviathans, aiming at maximizing tax revenue. In addition to tax revenue, state 2 policy maker cares about workers’ welfare in the taxed industry.

Using the expression for $Q_i(T, t_i)$ in (6), it is immediate to derive the formulae for tax revenue for, respectively, the federal and the state governments:

$$
R(T, t_1, t_2) = \sum_{i=1}^{2} Q_i(T, t_i)T = \sum_{i=1}^{2} \frac{m}{1 + m} b(\alpha - T - t_i)n_iT,
$$

$$
r_i(T, t_i) = Q_i(T, t_i)t_i = \frac{m}{1 + m} b(\alpha - T - t_i)n_iti, \quad i = 1, 2.
$$

As a proxy for workers’ welfare, consider aggregate production costs in the taxed industry:

$$
C(T, t_1, t_2) = \sum_{i=1}^{2} \epsilon Q_i(T, t_i) = \sum_{i=1}^{2} \frac{m}{1 + m} cb(\alpha - T - t_i)n_i.
$$
It is then assumed that the objective function of state 2 policy maker is given by a weighted sum of tax revenue and production costs:

\[ r_2(T, t_2) + \omega C(T, t_1, t_2), \]  

where \( \omega \in [0, 1] \). There are at least two alternative ways of interpreting the term \( \omega C(.) \) in the objective function (12). If we assume that labor is the only input into production, so that \( C(.) \) represents total wages paid to workers, then \( \omega \) represents a taste parameter, showing that the policy maker is ready to give up one dollar of tax revenue provided that wage outlays are increased by at least \( \omega \) dollars. If, instead, we assume that labor costs account for only a part of total costs \( C(.) \), and that the policy maker is ready to substitute tax revenue and wage outlays one dollar for one dollar, then the parameter \( \omega \) represents the labor costs’ share in production costs \( C(.) \).

Given these hypotheses, the social optimum is defined by the tax rates that maximize:

\[ W(T, t_1, t_2) = R(T, t_1, t_2) + \sum_{i=1}^{2} r_i(T, t_i) + \omega C(T, t_1, t_2). \]  

(13)

It is immediate to see, from the expressions for tax revenues (9)–(10) and for production costs (11), that the objective function (13) depends on the total tax rates (i.e. \( T + t_i \), \( i = 1, 2 \)) in each region, since federal and state taxation are perfect substitutes. The social optimum, that we characterize in the following proposition, corresponds therefore to the tax policy that would be chosen by a single decision maker aiming at maximizing the objective function (13).

**Proposition 1** In the social optimum, the optimal tax rates are:

\[ \hat{T} + \hat{t}_i = \frac{1}{2} \alpha - \frac{1}{2} \omega c, \quad i = 1, 2. \]  

(14)

**Proof.** Substituting for \( T + t_i = \tau_i \), \( i = 1, 2 \), in eq. (13) one gets:

\[ W(\tau_1, \tau_2) = \frac{m}{1 + m} \sum_{i=1}^{2} b(\alpha - \tau_i)n_i(\tau_i + \omega c). \]

By differentiating this expression with respect to \( \tau_i \) we then get the first order condition \( \alpha - 2\tau_i - \omega c = 0 \) that gives the solution \( \hat{\tau}_i \) in (14).

Since federal and state tax rates are, within each region, perfect substitutes, the social optimum defines only the total level of taxation, leaving undetermined its sharing
between the upper and lower layers of government. As expected, the optimal tax rates are a decreasing function of $\omega$, since labor costs are monotonically decreasing in the level of taxation. If all policy makers are pure Leviathans (i.e. $\omega = 0$) then the social optimum implies the maximization of aggregate tax revenue, at the bliss point of the Laffer curve in each region. Notice also that the optimal tax rates are uniform across regions, since the aggregate objective function (13) treats symmetrically labor costs ('located' in region 2) and tax revenue in all regions and at all levels of government. Notice finally that the optimal tax rates are independent of market structure (the number of firms, $m$), although the optimal levels of tax revenue are increasing in $m$.

3 Tax policy in the absence of lobbying

In this section we consider tax policy in the absence of lobbying by firms. Therefore, each policy maker sets, simultaneously and independently from the other policy makers, its own tax rate. We make the assumption that each policy maker ignores the impact of his actions on the payoffs of the other policy makers (see Section 7 for a discussion of this point). Therefore, the federal policy maker maximizes tax revenue $R(.)$, the state 1 policy maker maximizes $r_1(.)$, and the state 2 policy maker maximizes $r_2(.) + \omega C(.)$. The Nash equilibrium of this game is characterized in the following:

**Proposition 2** Suppose there is no lobbying by firms and that each policy maker non-cooperatively and simultaneously sets its own tax rate. In the unique Nash Equilibrium, tax rates are:

\[
\hat{T} = \frac{1}{3} \alpha + \frac{n_2}{3} \omega c,
\]

(15)

\[
\hat{t}_1 = \frac{1}{3} \alpha - \frac{n_2}{6} \omega c,
\]

(16)

\[
\hat{t}_2 = \frac{1}{3} \alpha - \left(\frac{n_2}{6} + \frac{1}{2}\right) \omega c,
\]

(17)

---

Clearly, this is due to the fact that the aggregate social welfare function (13) is additive and linear in tax revenues. Ignore workers’ welfare ($\omega = 0$) and suppose, instead, to define social welfare as $W = H(R) + \sum_{i=1}^{2} h(r_i)$, with $H(R)$ and $h(r_i)$ denoting the social value (in terms of public goods produced) of the federal and the state tax revenues, respectively, with $H' > 0$, $H'' < 0$, $h' > 0$, $h'' < 0$. In this case, and in the absence of intergovernmental transfers, federal and state taxation are no longer perfect substitutes of each other. Therefore, the social optimum defines in general distinct values for $\hat{T}$ and $\hat{t}_i$. 

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9
while total tax rates are:

\[
\tilde{T} + \tilde{t}_1 = \frac{2}{3} \alpha + \frac{n_2}{6} \omega c, \tag{18}
\]

\[
\tilde{T} + \tilde{t}_2 = \frac{2}{3} \alpha + \left(\frac{n_2}{6} - \frac{1}{2}\right) \omega c. \tag{19}
\]

**Proof.** Denote with \(T(\cdot), t_1(\cdot)\) and \(t_2(\cdot)\), respectively, the best response function (or reaction function) of the federal, state 1 and state 2 policy makers to any given tax policy chosen by the other policy makers. Formally, by maximizing \(R(\cdot)\) in (9) with respect to \(T\), \(r_1(\cdot)\) in (10) with respect to \(t_1\), and \(r_2(\cdot) + \omega C(\cdot)\) in (12) with respect to \(t_2\), and then solving for the relevant tax rate, we obtain, respectively,

\[
T(t_1, t_2) = \frac{1}{2} (\alpha - n_1 t_1 - n_2 t_2), \tag{20}
\]

\[
t_1(T) = \frac{1}{2} (\alpha - T), \tag{21}
\]

\[
t_2(T) = \frac{1}{2} (\alpha - T - \omega c). \tag{22}
\]

The best response functions (20)–(22) form a system of linear equations in the tax rates \(T, t_1\) and \(t_2\). Its solution gives the unique Nash equilibrium (15)–(17) and the total tax rates (18)–(19).

Taxation is uniform, both between layers of government and across regions, if all policy makers are pure Leviathans (\(\omega = 0\)). Notice also, from the best response functions (20)–(22), that the federal and the state tax rates are strategic substitutes.\(^9\) Taxation is instead asymmetric, with \(\tilde{T} > \tilde{t}_1 > \tilde{t}_2\) for individual tax rates, and \(\tilde{T} + \tilde{t}_1 > \tilde{T} + \tilde{t}_2\) for total tax rates, if the policy maker in state 2 attaches some weight on wage outlays in the taxed industry (\(\omega > 0\)). The size of the asymmetry depends not only on the size of \(\omega\) but also on the mass, \(n_2\), of consumers that are resident in state 2. The sources of the asymmetry are clear by looking at the reaction functions (20)–(22). The state 2 policy maker’s concern for workers’ welfare, represented by the term \(-\omega c/2\) in her reaction function, causes a downward pressure on \(t_2\). In turn, this induces the federal government to increase its tax rate \(T\); but this in turn induces the policy maker in state 1 to decrease her tax rate \(t_1\), thus reinforcing the incentive for the federal policy maker to increase her tax rate \(T\). The deviation from Leviathan behavior of state 2 policy maker bears therefore an impact on state 1 tax policy that is channeled through the reaction of the federal policy maker.

\(^9\)This is due to the fact that the demand of the taxed good is linear. With an isoelastic demand, the federal and the state tax rates would be strategic complements (Keen, 1998, p. 462).
Let us now formally compare, in the following proposition, the total tax rates in the Nash equilibrium with those obtained in Proposition 1 for the social optimum.

**Proposition 3** The comparison between total tax rates in the Nash Equilibrium without lobbying and the corresponding total tax rates in the social optimum is as follows:

\[
\hat{T} + \hat{t}_1 - (\hat{T} + \hat{t}_1) = \frac{1}{6} \omega + \left( \frac{n_2}{6} + \frac{1}{2} \right) \omega c > 0
\]

\[
\hat{T} + \hat{t}_2 - (\hat{T} + \hat{t}_2) = \frac{1}{6} \omega + \frac{n_2}{6} \omega c > 0
\]

**Proof.** By simple subtraction of the tax rates in (14) from the corresponding tax rates in (18)–(19).

This proposition makes it clear that, because of vertical tax externalities, independent tax setting determines over-taxation with respect to the social optimum. As expected, for \( \omega > 0 \) the upward bias in total taxation is more severe in state 1 than in state 2. Somewhat surprisingly, the concern for workers’ welfare reinforces over-taxation also in state 2, as shown by the second term in expression (24); this result can be explained by observing that lower taxation at the state level is more than compensated by higher taxation at the federal level.

4 Lobbying for tax rates cuts

We are now ready to address the central issue of the paper, by examining what happens when the producers exert pressure on policy makers in order to obtain a more favorable taxation of their sales. Concerning lobbying behavior, the first assumption we make is that of full cooperation among firms: while competing in their product market, firms act as a single body when making pressure on policy makers for tax rates cuts. This is likely to be the case, for instance, when producers deal with other economic institutions (e.g., trade unions, consumers’ organizations) by means of an association representing their interests. The second assumption we make is that the lobbying activity takes a ‘legal’ and ‘public’ form, in which the producers’ association makes monetary offers to policy makers (in the form of campaign contributions, for instance) conditional on tax rates cuts. This ‘buying influence’ approach for modelling lobbying behavior has been popularized in the context of ‘common agency’ games by Dixit et al. (1997) and Grossman and Helpman (1994, 2001), building on previous work by Bernheim and

\[^{10}\text{Clearly, there is no need to justify the presence of a single lobby when the market is monopolized.}\]
Whinston (1986a,b). However, their common agency framework — in which there are many principals, the lobbying groups, and one agent, the policy maker— does not fit into our setting, starring one principal (the producers association) and many agents (the policy makers). We therefore appeal to the model in Segal (1999) that, although not focusing explicitly on lobbying activities, is cast in terms of a single principal contracting with many agents.\footnote{The more general class of many-principals many-agents models, known as ‘games played through agents’, has been analyzed by Prat and Rustichini (2003).}

Formally, the objective function of the federal policy maker is now given by:

\[ V(T, t_1, t_2, Z) = R(T, t_1, t_2) + \lambda Z, \tag{25} \]

where \( Z \geq 0 \) represents the contribution offered by firms, whereas \( \lambda, 0 \leq \lambda \leq 1, \) is a ‘taste’ parameter representing the importance that the policy maker attaches to one dollar of contributions relative one dollar of tax revenue.\footnote{Most of the literature on lobbying focuses on the case in which utility is transferable between the principal(s) and the agent(s), by assuming \( \lambda = 1. \) The taste parameter \( \lambda \) was first introduced by Persson (1998).} The objective function of the state policy makers is amended in a similar way:

\[ v_1(T, t_1, z_1) = r_1(T, t_1) + \lambda z_1, \tag{26} \]

\[ v_2(T, t_1, t_2, z_2) = r_2(T, t_2) + \omega C(T, t_1, t_2) + \lambda z_2, \tag{27} \]

where \( z_i \geq 0, i = 1, 2, \) is the contribution paid to state \( i \) policy maker. Notice that we are assuming that policy makers have identical preferences for the lobbyist’s contributions, since the parameter \( \lambda \) is uniform.

Net of contributions to policy makers, firms aggregate profits are equal to:

\[ \pi(T, t_1, t_2, Z, z_1, z_2) = \Pi(T, t_1, t_2) - (Z + z_1 + z_2), \tag{28} \]

where aggregate gross profits, \( \Pi(T, t_1, t_2) \), are defined in (8). Since firms are identical, it is assumed that the monetary contributions are equally shared among them.

Following Segal (1999), we set up a two-stage game. In the first stage, the firms association (the principal) credibly sends a triplet of ‘offers’, \((T^*, Z^*), (t_1^*, z_1^*) \) and \((t_2^*, z_2^*)\), to the federal, state 1 and state 2 policy makers (the agents), respectively. We assume, as in Segal (1999, Section III), that these offers are publicly observed.\footnote{Like in the literature quoted above, we assume that information is complete. Concerning her offers to the agents, however, the principal can make either public offers (Segal, Section III) or private offers (Segal, Section IV). For simplicity, we focus on public offers, although we recognize that also the case of private offers could be of interest.} In the
second stage, the policy makers simultaneously decide whether to accept or reject their respective offers. A policy maker accepting her offer would cash the contribution and implement the tax rate ‘attached’ to the offer. A policy maker not accepting the offer would instead cash no contribution and would be free to set the tax rate that maximizes her own objective function. Within this kind of game, we now characterize the Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibria that maximize the producers aggregate net profits.\footnote{In general, this kind of games admit a multiplicity of equilibria. Following Segal (1999), we thus focus on the Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE) that are preferred by the principal. Moreover, given the specific functional forms we adopted for tax revenues and firms’ profits, the principal’s preferred SPNE is unique.}

Formally, the producers association select the offers \((T^*, Z^*)\), \((t_1^*, z_1^*)\) and \((t_2^*, z_2^*)\) that maximize its net profits (28) subject to the policy makers’ participation constraints:

\[
\begin{align*}
R(T, t_1, t_2) + \lambda Z &\geq R \left[ T(t_1, t_2), t_1, t_2 \right], \\
r_1(T, t_1) + \lambda z_1 &\geq r_1 \left[ T, t_1(T) \right], \\
r_2(T, t_2) + \omega C(T, t_1, t_2) + \lambda z_2 &\geq r_2 \left[ T, t_2(T) \right] + \omega C \left[ T, t_1, t_2(T) \right],
\end{align*}
\]

where \(T(t_1, t_2), t_1(T)\) and \(t_2(T)\) are the best response functions defined in (20)–(22).

The left-hand sides of these inequalities contain the objective functions, defined in (25)–(27), of the corresponding policy maker. The key point is the characterization, in the right-hand sides of the inequalities, of the outside options of the policy makers. To illustrate, consider the participation constraint (29) of the federal policy maker (a similar interpretation can be given for the other participation constraints). Were this agent to reject the offer made by the principal, his payoff would include only the federal tax revenue, that in turn depends on the tax rates, \(t_1\) and \(t_2\), set by the state policy makers, as well as on his own best response, \(T(t_1, t_2)\), to these tax rates. The outside option of the federal policy maker is therefore endogenous to the tax rates set by the other policy makers. In this respect, our framework is more complex than the one considered in Segal (1999), in which the agents’ outside options (or non trade options, in his terminology) are instead exogenously given.

Notice that the association of producers can always make a ‘trivial’ set of offers to policy makers, formally \((\bar{T}, 0), (\bar{t}_1, 0)\) and \((\bar{t}_2, 0)\), in which no contributions are offered in exchange for the tax rates (15)–(17) that would be set in the Nash equilibrium in the absence of lobbying (Proposition 2). We can thus focus, without loss of generality,
only on the triplets of offers satisfying the participation constraints (29)–(31) and such that each policy maker accepts the offer made by the principal. Moreover, it is also immediate to see that a profit maximizing principal will make only offers such that all participation constraints are binding: if a participation constraint does not hold as an equality, the principal can always reduce the contribution to the agent without inducing her to reject the offer.\textsuperscript{15} These remarks allow us to use the participation constraints (29)–(31), holding as equality, to define the monetary contribution as a function of the relevant tax rates:

\[ Z(T, t_1, t_2) = \lambda^{-1} \left\{ R[T(t_1, t_2), t_1, t_2] - R(T, t_1, t_2) \right\}, \]  

\[ z_1(T, t_1) = \lambda^{-1} \left\{ r_1[T, t_1(T)] - r_1(T, t_1) \right\}, \]  

\[ z_2(T, t_1, t_2) = \lambda^{-1} \left\{ r_2[T, t_2(T)] + \omega C[T, t_1, t_2(T)] - r_2(T, t_2) - \omega C(T, t_1, t_2) \right\}. \]  

These contributions satisfying the policy makers participation constraints are then plugged into the expression (28) for firms aggregate net profits, to get:

\[ \pi(T, t_1, t_2) = \Pi(T, t_1, t_2) + \lambda^{-1} W(T, t_1, t_2) + \right) \]  

\[ -\lambda^{-1} \left\{ R[T(t_1, t_2), t_1, t_2] + \sum_{i=1}^{2} r_i[T, t_i(T)] + \omega C[T, t_1, t_2(T)] \right\}, \]  

where \( W(T, t_1, t_2) \) is the sum of the policy makers objective functions defined in (13). Notice that, for \( \lambda = 1 \), the sum of the first two terms in the expression (35), \( \Pi(.) + W(.) \), is equal to the joint surplus of the principal and the agents. Were the third term in curly brackets absent, the maximization of net profits \( \pi(T, t_1, t_2) \) would thus lead to an efficient outcome for the principal and the agents (Segal, 1999, proposition 1). This latter term, that accounts for the externalities that each agent causes on the other agents’ reservation utilities, causes the chosen policy by the principal to fall short of the efficient outcome.\textsuperscript{16}

The firms’ association selects the tax rates to be included in the offers made to policy makers by maximizing its net profits (35). Denote the solution to this problem\textsuperscript{15}In equilibrium, all policy makers are therefore indifferent between accepting and rejecting the offer presented to them by the firms association. Being indifferent, we then make the standard assumption that the agents accept the offers, since this is the outcome preferred by the principal.\textsuperscript{16}We do not formally make the comparison between the equilibrium outcome and the efficient outcome that maximizes the joint surplus of the principal and the agents, since our interest is on the comparison between tax policy under lobbying and the socially optimal policy.
with $T^*$, $t_1^*$ and $t_2^*$. By substituting these optimal tax rates into eqs. (32)–(34) we then find the optimal monetary contributions, $Z^* = Z(T^*, t_1^*, t_2^*)$, $z_1^* = z_1(T^*, t_1^*)$ and $z_2^* = z_2(T^*, t_1^*, t_2^*)$. Finally, the equilibrium net profits are determined by substituting the optimal tax rates and contributions into eq. (28). The equilibrium tax rates are presented in the following:

**Proposition 4** Suppose that the association of producers lobbies the policy makers for tax rates reductions. Let:

\[
\phi = \frac{\lambda}{1 + m}, \quad \Phi = \frac{9 - 12\phi}{9 - 8\phi}, \quad \Phi_{12} = \frac{(19 - 16\phi)\phi}{(9 - 8\phi)(1 - \phi)}, \quad \Phi_2 = \frac{1}{1 - \phi}.
\]

In the unique Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the lobbying game, tax rates are:

\[
T^* = \Phi \left( \frac{1}{3} \alpha \right) + \Phi \left( \frac{n_2}{3 \omega_c} \right), \quad (36)
\]

\[
t_1^* = \Phi \left( \frac{1}{3} \alpha \right) + (1 - \Phi_{12}) \left( -\frac{n_2}{6 \omega_c} \right), \quad (37)
\]

\[
t_2^* = \Phi \left( \frac{1}{3} \alpha \right) + (1 - \Phi_{12}) \left( -\frac{n_2}{6 \omega_c} \right) + \Phi_2 \left( -\frac{1}{2 \omega_c} \right), \quad (38)
\]

while total tax rates are:

\[
T^* + t_1^* = \Phi \left( \frac{2}{3} \alpha \right) + (2\Phi - 1 + \Phi_{12}) \left( \frac{n_2}{6 \omega_c} \right), \quad (39)
\]

\[
T^* + t_2^* = \Phi \left( \frac{2}{3} \alpha \right) + (2\Phi - 1 + \Phi_{12}) \left( \frac{n_2}{6 \omega_c} \right) + \Phi_2 \left( -\frac{1}{2 \omega_c} \right), \quad (40)
\]

where

\[
2\Phi - 1 + \Phi_{12} = \frac{3(3 - 2\phi)}{(9 - 8\phi)(1 - \phi)}.
\]

**Proof.** By differentiating the net profits function (35) with respect to the tax rates, we get the first order conditions:

\[
\lambda \frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial T} + \frac{\partial W}{\partial T} - \sum_{i=1}^{2} \left( \frac{\partial r_i}{\partial T} + \frac{\partial r_i}{\partial t_1} \frac{\partial t_1}{\partial T} \right) - \omega \left( \frac{\partial C}{\partial T} + \frac{\partial C}{\partial t_2} \frac{\partial t_2}{\partial T} \right) = 0, \quad (41)
\]

\[
\lambda \frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial t_1} + \frac{\partial W}{\partial t_1} - \left( \frac{\partial R}{\partial T} \frac{\partial T}{\partial t_1} + \frac{\partial R}{\partial t_1} \right) - \omega \frac{\partial C}{\partial t_1} = 0, \quad (42)
\]

\[
\lambda \frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial t_2} + \frac{\partial W}{\partial t_2} - \left( \frac{\partial R}{\partial T} \frac{\partial T}{\partial t_2} + \frac{\partial R}{\partial t_2} \right) = 0, \quad (43)
\]

where

\[
\frac{\partial W}{\partial T} = \frac{\partial R}{\partial T} + \sum_{i=1}^{2} \frac{\partial r_i}{\partial T} + \omega \frac{\partial C}{\partial T},
\]

\[
\frac{\partial W}{\partial t_i} = \frac{\partial R}{\partial t_i} + \frac{\partial r_i}{\partial t_i} + \omega \frac{\partial C}{\partial t_i}, \quad i = 1, 2.
\]
Using eqs. (8), (9), (10) and (11) to compute the partial derivatives with respect to $\Pi$, $R$, $r_i$ and $C$, respectively; using eqs. (20)–(22) to compute the partial derivatives of the reaction functions $T(.)$, $t_1(.)$ and $t_2(.)$, and then solving the linear equation system (41)–(43), we get the equilibrium tax rates (36)–(38).

Expressions (36)–(40) for the tax rates under lobbying can be easily compared with the corresponding expressions (15)–(19) in Proposition 2 for the tax rates in the absence of lobbying. Formally, the impact of lobbying on tax policy is fully captured by the coefficients $\Phi_2$ and $\Phi_2$. If $\lambda = 0$ (lobbying is not effective, because policy makers do not care about campaign contributions) and/or if $m \to \infty$ (the market approaches perfect competition, so that profits tend to zero and firms have no incentive to lobby), then $\Phi = 1$, $\Phi_1 = 0$ and $\Phi_2 = 1$, and therefore the tax rates in (36)–(40) are equal to the corresponding tax rates in (15)–(19).

Consider the first (common) terms in tax rates (36)–(40), those reflecting the Leviathan objectives of the policy makers. It is straightforward to see that:

for given $m$, $\Phi(\lambda) > 0$, $\Phi'(\lambda) < 0$, $\Phi(0) = 1$, $\Phi(1) = \frac{9m - 3}{9m + 1} < 1$.

Therefore, in the absence of concern for workers’ welfare ($\omega = 0$), lobbying reduces all tax rates to the same extent ($\Phi < 1$), and the more so the larger is $\lambda$. Moreover, the higher the number of firms, the lower the impact of lobbying in reducing the tax rates.

For instance, if the market is monopolized ($m = 1$) and $\lambda = 1$, then $\Phi = \frac{3}{5}$, so that lobbying reduces the Leviathan component of tax rates by 40%; if, instead, $m = 11$ and $\lambda = 1$, then $\Phi = .96$, so that the impact of lobbying is to reduce this component of the tax rates by only 4%.

Consider now the terms in the tax rates (36)–(38) that depend on the parameter $\omega$, reflecting the interest of the state 2 policy maker about workers’ welfare in the taxed industry. We can show that:

for given $m$, $\Phi_1(\lambda) > 0$, $\Phi_1'(\lambda) > 0$, $\Phi_1(0) = 0$, $\Phi_1(1) = \frac{19m + 3}{(9m + 1)m}$,

for given $m$, $\Phi_2(\lambda) > 0$, $\Phi_2'(\lambda) > 0$, $\Phi_2(0) = 1$, $\Phi_2(1) = \frac{1 + m}{m}$.

Hence, for $\omega > 0$ and $\lambda > 0$, lobbying tends (a) to reduce the federal tax rate, $T^*$, since the second term in (36) is multiplied by $\Phi < 1$; (b) to increase (somewhat surprisingly) the state 1 tax rate, $t_1^*$, since the second term in (37) is multiplied by $(1 - \Phi_1) < 1$; and (c) both to increase and to decrease the state 2 tax rate, $t_2^*$, since the second and
the third terms in (38) are multiplied by \((1 - \Phi_{12}) < 1\) and \(\Phi_2 > 0\), respectively (it is likely, however, that the third term prevails over the second one).

As for the total tax rates \((39)-(40)\), it is immediate to see that \((2\Phi - 1 + \Phi_{12}) > 1\) for \(\lambda > 0\). Therefore, lobbying: (a) reduces the first term in \((39)-(40)\); (b) increases the second term in \((39)-(40)\); (c) increases, in absolute value, the third term in \((40)\).

To illustrate the impact of the parameters \(\lambda\) and \(m\) on the total tax rates, it is useful to look, in Figure 1, at the results of a numerical simulation (the other parameters are set at \(n_1 = n_2 = 0.5, \omega = 0.8, \alpha = 3\)). Figure 1a shows the total tax rate \(T^* + t_1^*\) in the non-producer state as a function of \(\lambda\), for different levels of \(m\). As expected, a more effective lobbying (a higher \(\lambda\)) causes a higher reduction in the total tax rate, and the more so the smaller is the number of producers, \(m\). Total tax rates in the producer state, \(T^* + t_2^*\), see Figure 1b, show a qualitative similar pattern, although, as shown in Figure 1c for \(m = 1\), they are always below those set in the non-producer state.

5 Tax assignment with Leviathan policy makers

We now examine the tax assignment problem. In order to get clear-cut results, we focus on the special case in which all policy makers are revenue maximizers. In this setting, it is immediate to show that:

**Lemma 1** If all policy makers are pure Leviathans (i.e. \(\omega = 0\)), it is then equivalent to assign the power to tax either to the federal government or to the state governments, whether firms lobby the policy makers or not.

**Proof.** Suppose that only the federal government can levy the excise tax at rate \(\tau = T\), with \(t_i = 0\), \(i = 1, 2\). From eq. (9), aggregate tax revenue is then equal to \(R(\tau, 0, 0) = \sum_{i=1}^{2} \mu b(\alpha - \tau) n_i \tau, \mu = m(1 + m)^{-1}\), while from eq. (8) aggregate profits are \(\Pi(\tau, 0, 0) = \sum_{i=1}^{2} \mu b(1 + m)^{-1} b(\alpha - \tau)^2 n_i\). Suppose now that only the state governments can levy the tax, at rates \(\tau_i = t_i, T = 0\). From eqs. (10) and (8), aggregate tax revenue and gross profits are then equal to \(\sum_{i=1}^{2} r_i(0, \tau_i) = \mu b(\alpha - \tau_i) n_i \tau_i\), \(\Pi(0, \tau_1, \tau_2) = \sum_{i=1}^{2} \mu b(1 + m)^{-1} b(\alpha - \tau_i)^2 n_i\), respectively. By symmetry, and since there are no horizontal tax externalities between the state governments, in equilibrium (with, or without, lobbying) \(\tau_1 = \tau_2\). Therefore, \(R(\tau, 0, 0) = \sum_{i=1}^{2} r_i(0, \tau_i)\) and \(\Pi(\tau, 0, 0) = \Pi(0, \tau_1, \tau_2)\), that gives the equivalence result.

Since (a) policy makers are assumed to have the same policy objective —tax revenue maximization, (b) federal and state tax revenues are perfect substitutes into the
Figure 1a: Non-producer state

Figure 1b: Producer state

Figure 1c: Producer vs. Non-producer state
social welfare function — aggregate tax revenues, (c) policy makers are assumed to show the same interest for campaign contributions (i.e. uniform $\lambda$), and (d) there are no horizontal tax externalities between the state governments, then centralized tax setting turns out to be equivalent to decentralized tax setting.\footnote{The role of assumption (b) is discussed in footnote 8 above.} For the tax assignment problem, the relevant comparison is therefore between taxation by both layers of government and taxation by anyone of the two layers, using the social optimum as a normative benchmark. In this respect, the following proposition focuses on the equilibrium tax rates.

**Proposition 5** Let $\phi = \lambda(1+m)^{-1}$. Suppose that all policy makers are pure Leviathans (i.e. $\omega = 0$). Then:

- The socially optimal tax rates are (Proposition 1):
  \[ \hat{T} + \hat{t}_i = \frac{1}{2} \alpha, \quad i = 1, 2. \]

- If both layers of government have the power to tax, and if firms lobby the policy makers, the equilibrium total tax rates are (Proposition 4):
  \[ T^* + t^*_i = \left( \frac{9 - 12\phi}{9 - 8\phi} \right) \left( \frac{2}{3} \alpha \right), \quad i = 1, 2. \]

  If $m = 1$, then $T^* + t^*_i \lessgtr \hat{T} + \hat{t}_i$ for $\lambda \lessgtr \frac{3}{4}$. If $m \geq 2$, $m$ integer, then $T^* + t^*_i > \hat{T} + \hat{t}_i$ for all $\lambda \in [0, 1]$.

- If only one layer of government has the power to tax, at rate $\tau_i$, and if firms lobby the policy makers, the equilibrium (total) tax rates are:
  \[ \tau^*_i = \left( \frac{1 - 2\phi}{1 - \phi} \right) \left( \frac{1}{2} \alpha \right), \quad i = 1, 2, \]
  where $\tau^*_i \leq \hat{T} + \hat{t}_i$ for all $m \geq 1$, $m$ integer, $\lambda \in [0, 1]$.

**Proof.** The socially optimal tax rates come trivially from setting $\omega = 0$ in eq. (14). Similarly, from eqs. (39)–(40), for the tax rates under tax base overlapping. It is then immediate to see that $T^* + t^*_i \lessgtr \hat{T} + \hat{t}_i$ for $\phi \lessgtr 3/8$; thus, from the definition of $\phi$, $T^* + t^*_i \lessgtr \hat{T} + \hat{t}_i$ for $\lambda \lessgtr 3/4$ if $m = 1$ and $T^* + t^*_i > \hat{T} + \hat{t}_i$ for all $\lambda \in [0, 1]$ if $m \geq 2$. As for the tax rates $\tau^*_i$, suppose, using Lemma 1, that taxation is centralized.
Then, the association of firms makes an offer \((\tau^*, Z^*)\) to the federal policy maker with the property that \((\tau^*, Z^*) = \arg \max \Pi(\tau, 0, 0) - Z\), subject to the participation constraint \(R(\tau, 0, 0) + \lambda Z = R(\overline{\tau}, 0, 0)\), where \(\Pi(\tau, 0, 0) = \sum_{i=1}^{2} \mu(1 + m)^{-1}(\alpha - \tau)^2 n_i\), \(R(\tau, 0, 0) = \sum_{i=1}^{2} \mu b(\alpha - \tau)n_i \tau\), \(\overline{\tau} = \arg \max R(\tau, 0, 0)\), \(\mu = m(1 + m)^{-1}\). The solution to this constrained maximization problem gives the uniform tax rates \(\tau_i^*\). Given that \(m \geq 1\) and \(\lambda \in [0, 1]\), then \(\phi \in [0, 1/2]\); therefore \(\tau_i^* \leq \overline{T} + \hat{t}_i\).

To interpret these results, one has to bear in mind that while tax bases overlapping leads to excessive taxation, lobbying by firms leads to less than optimal taxation. The final outcome depends therefore on the balance between these two forces. If lobbying is not effective (i.e. if \(\lambda = 0\)), or if the market approaches perfect competition (i.e. if \(m \to \infty\)), then \(\phi = 0\), and therefore taxation is excessive under tax base overlapping \((T^* + t^*_i > \overline{T} + \hat{t}_i)\) whereas it is socially optimal in the absence of tax base overlapping \((\tau^*_i = \overline{T} + \hat{t}_i)\).

For \(\lambda > 0\), the equilibrium tax rates are a decreasing function of \(\lambda\), for given \(m\). Taxation by both layers of government implements the social optimum in the special case in which the market is monopolized \((m = 1)\) and lobbying is highly influential \((\lambda = 3/4)\). With two, or more, firms, tax base overlapping leads to excessive taxation even if lobbying exerts its maximal influence on tax policy \((\lambda = 1)\). Instead, taxation by one layer of government always falls short of the social optimum.\(^{18}\)

By comparing the equilibrium tax rates in the presence of lobbying, with and without tax bases overlapping, with the tax rates in the social optimum, we can state our final result in the following:

**Proposition 6** Suppose that all policy makers are pure Leviathans \((\omega = 0)\) and that firms lobby the policy makers for tax cuts. Let \(\phi^* = (5 - \sqrt{13})/8 \approx 0.174\). Then:

- If \(1 \leq m \leq 4\), \(m\) integer, and \(0 \leq \lambda \leq \phi^*(1 + m)\), then \(T^* + t_i^* - (\overline{T} + \hat{t}_i) > 0\). It is therefore optimal to assign the power to tax only to one layer of government.

- If \(1 \leq m \leq 4\), \(m\) integer, and \(\phi^*(1 + m) < \lambda \leq 1\), then \(\overline{T} + \hat{t}_i - \tau_i^* > |T^* + t_i^* - (\overline{T} + \hat{t}_i)| > 0\). It is therefore optimal to assign the power to tax to both layers of government.

\(^{18}\)In the special case in which \(\lambda = 1\), taxation by one layer of government implements the efficient policy for the principal and the agent(s), i.e. the policy that maximizes their joint surplus (tax revenue plus gross profits).
If \( m \geq 5 \), then \( T^* + t_i^* \geq T + \hat{t}_i - \tau_i^* > 0 \) for all \( 0 \leq \lambda \leq 1 \). It is therefore optimal to assign the power to tax only to one layer of government.

Proof. We know, from Proposition 5, that \( T^* + t_i^* \geq T + \hat{t}_i - \tau_i^* \) for \( 2 \leq \phi \leq 3 \), with equality for \( \phi = 0 \), increasing in \( \phi \). From the same proposition we know that 

\[
T^* + t_i^* \geq T + \hat{t}_i - \tau_i^* = \text{(5 - \sqrt{13})}/8.
\]

Hence \( T^* + t_i^* - (T + \hat{t}_i) \geq \text{(5 - \sqrt{13})}/8 \) for \( \phi \leq \phi^* \). Recalling that \( \phi = \lambda/(1 + m) \), and noting that \( 1/\phi^* \approx 5.737 \), it follows that if \( m \leq 4 \) there exists a \( \lambda^* = \phi^*(1 + m) \), such that \( T^* + t_i^* - (T + \hat{t}_i) \geq \text{(5 - \sqrt{13})}/8 \) for \( \lambda \leq \lambda^* \); if \( m \geq 5 \), then \( \phi^*(1 + m) > 1 \) and therefore \( T^* + t_i^* - (T + \hat{t}_i) \geq T + \hat{t}_i - \tau_i^* \) for all \( \lambda \in [0, 1] \). In order to identify the optimal tax regime, i.e. the one that maximizes tax revenue, it is then sufficient to see which tax rates are closer to the socially optimal tax rates, since the revenue functions are quadratic (therefore single peaked and symmetric) in the tax rates.

If the market is ‘highly’ concentrated, in particular with no more than four firms, and if policy makers attach a ‘high’ value to campaign contributions, in particular \( \lambda > \phi^*(1 + m) \), so that lobbying is ‘highly’ influential, then the total tax rates in the presence of tax base overlapping are closer to the socially optimal tax rates than those in the absence of tax base overlapping. Hence total tax revenue is closer to the social optimum under the former tax regime than under the latter. On the contrary, if the market is ‘highly’ concentrated (\( m \leq 4 \)), but lobbying is not very influential (\( \lambda < \phi^*(1 + m) \)), or if the market is composed of at least five firms, whatever their lobbying influence, then the optimal tax regime is the one assigning the power to tax to only one layer of government, because its tax rates and revenue are closer to the socially optimal values than those prevailing when both layers of government are entitled to tax.

The intuition for this result is the following. In the absence of lobbying, tax base overlapping leads to excessive taxation because of the vertical tax externalities between the two layers of government, whereas the one-layer tax regime implements the social optimum. For tax base overlapping to become the optimal regime, it is therefore necessary that lobbying causes a large downward distortion on tax rates, so that those under tax base overlapping get close to the social optimum, while those under no tax base overlapping fall well below the social optimum. But for lobbying to be highly effective, it is necessary that influence (\( \lambda \)) is high and that profits are high (small
number of firms, \( m \)). Notice also that, although lobbying by firms tends to reduce the equilibrium tax rates in both regimes, its impact is more relevant, for given ‘influence’ \((\lambda)\) and market structure \((m)\), when taxation is assigned to one layer of government than to both of them. In fact, in the latter case it is more difficult to ‘buy’ influence, since the externalities between the two levels of government call for compensating a policy maker not only for the distortions of her own tax rate but also for those on the tax rates of the other policy makers.

6 Stackelberg tax setting

In this section we consider a slightly different tax setting game, namely one in which the federal policy maker moves first, anticipating the impact of her actions on the choices made by the state policy makers. The analysis is restricted to the case of pure Leviathan policy makers \((\omega = 0)\). Moreover, since there are no horizontal tax externalities, and since we assume that state policy makers have identical preferences, we can also save on notation by restricting the analysis to the case of a single state government \((i = 1)\).

In the absence of lobbying, the Stackelberg equilibrium is characterized in the following:

**Proposition 7** Suppose there is no lobbying by firms and that the federal government is a Stackelberg leader. In the unique Stackelberg Nash Equilibrium, tax rates are:

\[
\tilde{T} = \frac{1}{2} \alpha, \quad \tilde{t}_i = \frac{1}{4} \alpha, \quad \tilde{T} + \tilde{t}_i = \frac{3}{4} \alpha.
\] (44)

**Proof.** Stage 2. Denote with \( t_i(\cdot) \) the best response function of state \( i \) policy maker to any given tax policy chosen by the federal policy maker. Formally, by maximizing \( r_i(\cdot) \) in (10) with respect to \( t_i \), and then solving for the relevant tax rate, we obtain

\[
t_i(T) = \frac{1}{2} (\alpha - T).
\] (45)

Stage 1. Substituting for \( t_i(T) \) into the federal revenue (9) and then maximizing with respect to \( T \) we find \( \tilde{T} \) in (44). Finally, substituting for \( \tilde{T} \) into (45) we find \( \tilde{t}_i \) in (44).

Comparing this equilibrium with sequential tax setting to the corresponding equilibrium with simultaneous tax setting (Proposition 2), we notice that the federal policy maker takes advantage from being the first mover, whereas the state policy maker gets
less revenue. On balance, the total tax rate under the Stackelberg equilibrium, \( \frac{3}{4} \alpha \), is higher than the total tax rate, \( \frac{2}{3} \alpha \), under the Nash equilibrium with simultaneous tax setting.

Also the lobbying game is divided into two stages. In the first stage, the association of producers lobbies the federal policy maker, anticipating the reaction of the state policy maker to federal tax setting as influenced by lobbying. In the second stage, producers lobby the state policy maker. Within each lobbying stage, producers move first by offering campaign contributions to the policy maker in exchange for a particular tax rate, and policy makers move second by accepting or rejecting the offer. The model is solved backward.

Stage 2 of the lobbying game. The producers association selects the offer \((t_i^{**}, z_i^{**})\) that maximizes its net profits \((28)\) subject to the state policy maker’s participation constraint:

\[
r_i(T, t_i) + \lambda z_i \geq r_i [T, t_i(T)],
\]

where \(t_i(T)\) is the best response function defined in \((45)\).

From \((46)\), holding as equality, we define:

\[
z_i(T, t_i) = \lambda^{-1} \{r_i [T, t_i(T)] - r_i(T, t_i)\}. 
\]

This contribution satisfying the policy maker’s participation constraint is then plugged into the expression \((28)\) for firms aggregate net profits, to get:

\[
\pi(T, t_i, Z) = \Pi(T, t_i) - Z + \lambda^{-1}r_i(T, t_i) - \lambda^{-1}r_i[T, t_i(T)]. 
\]

By maximizing this expression with respect to \(t_i\), for given \(T\), we obtain:

\[
t_i^{**}(T) = \left( \frac{1 - 2\phi}{1 - \phi} \right) \frac{1}{2} (\alpha - T), \quad \text{where } \phi = \frac{\lambda}{1 + m}. 
\]

Stage 1 of the lobbying game. Substitute \(t_i^{**}(T)\) into the federal tax revenue function \((9)\) to get \(R[T, t_i^{**}(T)]\) and then maximize with respect to \(T\), getting \(T^{**}\) as a solution. Then \(R[T^{**}, t_i^{**}(T^{**})]\) defines the outside option (reservation utility) of the federal policy maker, i.e. the tax revenue she would raise by refusing the offer of the lobby, but given that in the subsequent stage 2 the state policy maker accepts the offer. The participation constraint of the federal policy maker is thus:

\[
R[T, t_i^{**}(T)] + \lambda Z \geq R[T^{**}, t_i^{**}(T^{**})]. 
\]
When this holds as equality, we define:

$$Z(T) = \frac{1}{\lambda} \left\{ R[T^{**}, t_i^{**}(T^{**})] - R[T, t_i^{**}(T)] \right\}$$

(51)

Now substitute $t_i^{**}(T)$ for $t_i$ and $Z(T)$ for $Z$ into (48) to get:

$$\pi(T) = \Pi[T, t_i^{**}(T)] + \frac{1}{\lambda} R[T, t_i^{**}(T)] - \frac{1}{\lambda} R[T^{**}, t_i^{**}(T^{**})] +$$

$$+ \frac{1}{\lambda} r_i [T, t_i^{**}(T)] - \frac{1}{\lambda} r_i [T, t_i(T)].$$

(52)

The firms’ association selects the tax rate to be included in the offer made to the federal policy maker by maximizing this expression with respect to $T$. Let the solution be $T^*$. By substituting $T^*$ into (49) we then find $t_i^* = t_i^{**}(T^*)$. These solutions are shown in the following proposition (the computations to solve the game described above are omitted):

**Proposition 8** Let $\phi = \lambda(1 + m)^{-1}$. Suppose that the association of producers lobbies the policy makers for tax rates reductions. The federal policy maker is a Stackelberg leader. In the unique Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the lobbying game, individual tax rates are:

$$T^* = \frac{2(1 - \phi)}{2 - \phi} \left( \frac{1}{2} \alpha \right),$$

(53)

$$t_i^* = \frac{2(1 - 2\phi)}{(2 - \phi)(1 - \phi)} \left( \frac{1}{4} \alpha \right),$$

(54)

while total tax rates are:

$$T^* + t_i^* = \frac{4(1 - \phi)^2 + 2(1 - 2\phi)}{3(2 - \phi)(1 - \phi)} \left( \frac{3}{4} \alpha \right).$$

(55)

The next proposition focuses on the comparison between the socially optimal tax rates and those in the presence of lobbying (the proof, which is omitted, is similar to the one of Proposition 5 dealing with Nash tax setting).

**Proposition 9** (Stackelberg tax setting). Let $\phi = \lambda(1 + m)^{-1}$. Then:

- The socially optimal tax rates are (Proposition 1):

$$\hat{T} + \hat{t}_i = \frac{1}{2} \alpha, \quad i = 1, 2.$$
• If both layers of government have the power to tax, and if firms lobby the policy makers, the equilibrium total tax rates are (Proposition 8):

\[ T^* + t^*_i = \frac{4(1 - \phi)^2 + 2(1 - 2\phi)}{3(2 - \phi)(1 - \phi)} \left( \frac{3}{4} \right), \quad i = 1, 2. \]

If \( m = 1 \), then \( T^* + t^*_i \geq \hat{T} + \hat{i}_i \) for \( \lambda \leq 3 - \sqrt{5} \approx .764 \). If \( m \geq 2 \), \( m \) integer, then \( T^* + t^*_i > \hat{T} + \hat{i}_i \) for all \( \lambda \in [0, 1] \).

• If only one layer of government has the power to tax, at rate \( \tau_i \), and if firms lobby the policy makers, the equilibrium (total) tax rates are:

\[ \tau^*_i = \left( \frac{1 - 2\phi}{1 - \phi} \right) \left( \frac{1}{2} \alpha \right), \quad i = 1, 2, \]

where \( \tau^*_i \leq \hat{T} + \hat{i}_i \) for all \( m \geq 1 \), \( m \) integer, \( \lambda \in [0, 1] \).

By comparing the equilibrium tax rates in the presence of lobbying, with and without tax bases overlapping, with the tax rates in the social optimum, we can state the following proposition (again, the proof is omitted):

**Proposition 10** Suppose that firms lobby the policy makers for tax cuts. The federal policy maker is a Stackelberg leader. Let \( \phi^* = (5 - \sqrt{17})/4 \approx .219 \). Then:

- If \( 1 \leq m \leq 3 \), \( m \) integer, and \( 0 \leq \lambda \leq \phi^*(1 + m) \), then \( T^* + t^*_i - (\hat{T} + \hat{i}_i) \geq \hat{T} + \hat{i}_i - \tau^*_i > 0 \). It is therefore optimal to assign the power to tax only to one layer of government.

- If \( 1 \leq m \leq 3 \), \( m \) integer, and \( \phi^*(1 + m) < \lambda \leq 1 \), then \( \left| T^* + t^*_i - (\hat{T} + \hat{i}_i) \right| > 0 \). It is therefore optimal to assign the power to tax to both layers of government.

- If \( m \geq 4 \), \( m \) integer, then \( T^* + t^*_i - (\hat{T} + \hat{i}_i) \geq \hat{T} + \hat{i}_i - \tau^*_i > 0 \) for all \( 0 \leq \lambda \leq 1 \). It is therefore optimal to assign the power to tax only to one layer of government.

### 6.1 Comparing Nash and Stackelberg tax setting

As for tax assignment, by comparing Propositions 6 and 10 we can see that tax assignment to both levels of government is optimal in more cases under Nash than under Stackelberg tax setting. In fact, under Nash it might be optimal to entitle both levels of government with the power to tax only when \( m \leq 4 \), whereas under Stackelberg we have \( m \leq 3 \). Moreover, \( \phi^* \approx .174 \) under Nash whereas \( \phi^* \approx .392 \) under Stackelberg. Formally:

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Proposition 11 Suppose that firms lobby the policy makers for tax cuts. Let $\phi^{**} = (5 - \sqrt{7})/6 \approx 0.392$. Then:

- If $m = 1$ and $0 \leq \lambda < 2\phi^{**} \approx 0.785$, then total taxation is higher under Stackelberg than under Nash tax setting.
- If $m = 1$ and $2\phi^{**} < \lambda \leq 1$, then total taxation is higher under Nash than under Stackelberg tax setting.
- If $m \geq 2$, $m$ integer, then total taxation is higher under Stackelberg than under Nash tax setting for all $0 \leq \lambda \leq 1$.

7 The nature of the vertical tax externality

A rather restrictive assumption of our model concerns the kind of objective functions that policy makers maximize. In particular, we assumed that each policy maker cares only about her own tax revenue, thus ignoring the impact that her decisions may have on the tax revenue of the other policy makers. In short, we assumed that policy makers are ‘selfish Leviathan’. This is clearly unrealistic and indeed most of the literature on vertical tax externalities is built on more sophisticated hypotheses concerning the behavior of policy makers. Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002), for instance, assume that the federal policy maker fully takes into account of the negative externality caused by her tax decisions on the tax revenue of the state governments, so that there is no ‘top-down’ vertical externality; on the other hand, since the federal tax revenue is equally shared among the states, their policy makers do not fully internalize the impact of their decisions on the federal revenue, giving rise to a ‘bottom-up’ vertical externality. The point is that introducing this kind of behavior in our framework would simply make the vertical tax externalities disappear, with the result that the lobbying activity by firms would only move tax policy away from the social optimum. The source of this outcome —perfect substitutability of federal and state tax revenues— was pointed out in footnote 8 above. Here we add that the hypothesis is necessary for analytical tractability, as it allows us to explicitly solve for the lobbying game and to address the tax assignment problem.

There is however a simple way to acknowledge, at least in part, the kind of criticism outlined above, by amending our model in the following terms. Assume that the object-

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19We leave out from this discussion the issue of the producer’s state caring also for workers’ welfare.
ive function of the federal policy maker is now given by $R(T, t_1, t_2) + \Delta \sum_{i=1}^{2} r_i(T, t_i)$, where $\Delta \in [0, 1]$, whereas the objective function of the state $i$ policy maker is given by $r_i(T, t_i) + \delta R(T, t_1, t_2)$, $\delta \in [0, 1]$. The parameters $\Delta$ and $\delta$ measure, respectively, to what extent the federal and the state policy makers are able to internalize the vertical tax externality (clearly, it is reasonable to set $\Delta \geq \delta$). To illustrate, assume that $\delta = 0$; as pointed out above, if $\Delta = 1$ then taxation is set at the socially optimal level also under tax base overlapping, since the federal policy maker rationally sets $T = 0$, leaving then the state policy makers to set $t_i = \frac{1}{2} \alpha$ (this occurs under both Nash and Stackelberg tax setting). However, it is sufficient to assume that $\Delta < 1$ to have the vertical tax externalities at work. In qualitative terms, our results obtained under $\Delta = 0$ would therefore carry through also for $0 < \Delta < 1$ (of course, as $\Delta$ gets bigger, the distortions due to tax externalities become smaller, and therefore also the corrective role of lobbying becomes less important).

8 Conclusions

In this paper we have examined how tax setting in a federation with two layers of government is influenced by the lobbying activity of a special interest group. Concerning the tax assignment problem, our model highlights the antagonistic roles of vertical tax externalities and of lobbying pressure, with the former pushing tax rates above, and the latter below, their socially optimal level. In terms of tax revenue collected, the optimal tax regime was shown to depend on market structure and on the ability of the lobby to influence the policy makers. Therefore, our main conclusion is that the issue of tax assignment should not be dealt with without taking political institutions into account, in particular the role that special interest groups might play.

Among the possible extensions of our model, an important one concerns the introduction of the possibility of cross border shopping by consumers, induced by differentials in local tax rates. An additional factor, namely horizontal tax externalities among state governments, would come into play to define the optimal tax regime. Another possible extension is to consider a more general class of objective functions for the policy makers, including measures of consumers’ surplus and, depending on the type of commodity taxed, paternalistic concerns (for limiting consumption; e.g., cigarettes) or the internalization of external effects (e.g., the consumption of pollution generating goods).
References